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Recreational Zoning: Concept Used in Inappropriate Context Raises 
Troubling Issues 
 
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal  
Dec. 17, 1997 
 
 
By John R. Nolon 
 
[John R. Nolon is the Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor at Pace University 
School of Law, the Director of its Land Use Law Center and a recent Fulbright 
Scholar in Latin America.] 
 
Abstract: The Second Department Appellate Division’s holding in Bonnie Briar 
Syndicate, Inc. v. Mamaroneck upheld local rezoning in Mamaroneck, New York, 
from residential to recreational use despite legal challenges that the zoning 
change constituted an unreasonable use of municipal police power as well as a 
regulatory taking. The case cited several New York precedents.  Each held that 
so long as rezoning is in accordance with the local comprehensive plan, the 
zoning shall be held constitutional.  However, concerns linger among private 
residents and local municipalities regarding recreational rezoning projects, which 
despite providing significant benefits for the community, must be justified by a 




 Recreational zoning is a novel concept. It was upheld in Bonnie Briar 
Syndicate, Inc. v. Mamaroneck, a recent Second Department Appellate Division 
case (661 NYS2d 1005). The plaintiff alleged that the rezoning of its land from 
residential to recreational use was an unreasonable exercise of the police power 
and a regulatory taking.  The success of the case to date has led some to 
advocate recreational zoning as a means of preventing residential or commercial 
development of critical parcels of land in quite different contexts. Although the 
Appellate Division upheld a carefully reasoned Supreme Court decision (N.Y. 
Law Journal, July 19, 1997), the concept raises troubling issues if applied 
inappropriately in other situations.  
 
In Bonnie Briar, the Town of Mamaroneck rezoned three parcels of land 
consisting of 428 acres from R-30, allowing single family home construction on 
30,000 square foot lots, to R, a recreational zoning district. The new district 
limited principal permitted uses to private recreation facilities, such as country 
clubs, golf courses, fitness centers, riding stables, and tennis and swimming 
clubs. The recreational district includes lands owned by three private country 
clubs, including one operated by Bonnie Briar Country Club, Inc. on land owned 
by the plaintiff, the Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. The plaintiff’s land consists of 
141 acres that have been used continuously as a country club since 1921, prior 
to the adoption of the town’s first zoning ordinance.  Among other features, the 
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land contains scenic vistas, rock outcroppings, and wetlands and is within a 
critical flood plain of the town, which is situated on Long Island Sound whose 
environmental problems abound. 
 
Prior to the rezoning, the Town adopted an extensive Local Waterfront 
Revitalization Plan.  Pursuant to the plan, the Town adopted a number of 
measures including the challenged rezoning to prevent siltation, pollution and 
flooding.  Additional objectives of the rezoning were to maintain “important open 
space and recreational resources” and “the suburban quality of the community as 
a whole.” The plaintiff had proposed a tightly clustered subdivision of 71 homes, 
preserving 112 acres for open space and the continuation of the golf course. 
Plaintiff argued that its proposed development, which was denied as not 
permitted under the new zoning,  was consistent with the objectives of the Local 
Waterfront Revitalization Plan. 
 
 The plaintiff claimed that the rezoning constituted an unconstitutional taking of 
its property.  It argued that the amendment failed to substantially advance a 
legitimate public purpose, did not bear a close causal nexus with such a purpose, 
and that its restrictions are not roughly proportional to the impacts which might 
have resulted from the property’s development. The plaintiff also claimed that its 
property was unduly singled out to bear a public burden under the guise of 
regulation that takes away the use for which the property is reasonably adapted.  
 
 Judge Leavitt, writing for the Supreme Court in Westchester County, rejected 
these claims and, in doing so, presented a useful framework for applying 
regulatory takings law. He placed these facts within stable core of takings 
jurisprudence which involves regulations that apply generally throughout the 
community such as a zoning ordinance and its amendments, as in the instant 
case. Within this core, a number of settled principles apply. First, the regulations 
are presumed to be constitutional. Second, to overcome this presumption, the 
plaintiff must carry a heavy burden of proof  requiring a demonstration that the 
regulation is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, this burden is 
not carried when the plaintiff shows that the regulation has caused a significant 
diminution in the property’s value or that a substantially higher value could be 
obtained if an alternate use were permitted. Fourth, to carry its burden, the 
plaintiff must show that the land cannot yield an economically reasonable return 
under any use allowed by the zoning. Ironically, the population growth in the 
Mamaroneck area  due to the residential development of other land has created 
significant demand among relatively affluent people for the type of private 
recreational uses allowed by the recreational zone. 
 
 A principal claim of the plaintiff in Bonnie Briar was that the recreational 
zoning amendment was unreasonable because less restrictive means were 
available to accomplish the objectives sought. Without restricting the plaintiff’s 
right to build single family homes, the Town could have required a tightly 
clustered subdivision of the type proposed by the plaintiff. The court puts this 
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argument to rest, citing Tilles Investment Company v. Huntington (528 NYS2d 
386 (2nd Dept 1988)) for the proposition that “the Town was not required to 
explore or utilize alternative measures which would place less restrictions on the 
possible uses to which plaintiff’s property might be put.” To act otherwise would 
put the court in the position of second guessing the discretionary judgments of 
the local legislature. This is anathema to judges and why they cloak regulatory 
actions with a presumption of validity.  
 
 In rejecting the application of three much-trumpeted takings tests articulated 
by the U.S. Supreme Court and urged by the plaintiff, Judge Leavitt noted simply 
that they apply in an entirely different context of cases.  The plaintiff argued that 
Mamaroneck’s recreational zoning failed to pass the essential nexus, rough 
proportionality and individualized determination tests created by the Supreme 
Court in the 1987 Nollan (483 U.S. 825) and 1994  Dolan (512 U.S. 374) cases. 
These tests are reserved for situations where the government imposes an 
exaction, such as an affirmative easement, on the subject land in exchange for a 
development permit or otherwise disturbs the fundamental rights of owners to 
exclude others or to lease, dispose of or manage their properties. In these cases, 
the court applies a higher level of scrutiny, curious as to whether property rights 
are being taken as a regulatory shortcut to acquiring them by eminent domain 
and paying just compensation.  
 
To guide its curiosity in reviewing regulatory exactions of this kind, the court 
requires an essential nexus between the regulation and the public purpose 
served by the regulation. It further requires some rough proportionality between 
the burden imposed on the property by the regulation and the negative impact its 
proposed development would have on the public.  Some individualized 
determination, or study, of the impacts from this particular project is required.  In 
Grogan v. Zoning Board of Appeals (633 NYS2d 819 (2nd Dept 1995)) these tests 
were applied to the imposition of a scenic and conservation easement on an 
individual parcel of land.  The court noted that, in this context, the agency had a 
burden of demonstrating the required rough proportionality. By carefully 
explaining that these tests are not used to determine the validity of generally 
applicable zoning provisions, Judge Leavitt’s decision may help to quiet the 
concerns raised by commentators and practitioners who generalize too broadly 
about the applicability of these recently articulated tests. 
 
 The plaintiff cited Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. Mount Vernon (307 NY 493 
(1954)) for the proposition that its land was unduly singled out to bear a burden 
that should be borne by the public as a whole.  In that case, a two acre parcel 
situated across the street from a commuter train station was zoned exclusively 
for parking. The purpose of the zoning was to ease traffic congestion and 
improve parking conditions for the benefit of the community as a whole: a valid 
public purpose.  The Court of Appeals found, however, that this regulation 
constituted an “undue and uncompensated burden on the individual owner of a 
single parcel of land in the guise of regulation….”  It has long been established 
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that regulations may not be used as a means of carrying out an enterprise that 
the government is authorized to pursue through the exercise of its power of 
eminent domain which includes condemning land for parking. This singling out of 
a small  parcel was deemed to be “so unreasonable and arbitrary as to constitute 
an invasion of property rights, contrary to constitutional due process….”   
 
Another example of singling out a small parcel that was found to be 
unreasonable and void is found in Stevens v. Huntington (20 NY 2d 352 (1967)).  
In Stevens, the residential zoning of a one-acre tract of land located on a corner 
of a heavily traveled artery in a highly commercial shopping area was found to be 
an unconstitutional taking. Although there was no government enterprise 
furthered in this case, the court found that the property “is so totally unadaptable 
for residential use that the existing ordinance amounts practically to confiscation.”  
 
 The court in Bonnie Briar points out that, absent one of these special 
circumstances, there is nothing necessarily unconstitutional about singling out 
individual parcels for special regulation, citing several New York precedents. The 
test, in each case, is whether the regulation accomplishes the purposes of the 
community’s comprehensive plan. The recreational zone in Mamaroneck passes 
that test since it was adopted to protect the flood plain, maintain open space and 




 As the U. S. Supreme Court noted in Goldblatt v. Hempstead (369 U.S. 590 
(1962)),  “[T]his court, quite simply,  has been unable to develop any set formula 
for determining when justice and fairness require that economic injuries caused 
by public action be compensated by the Government, rather than remain 
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.” This is cautionary language.  
Regulators who are tempted to zone critically situated parcels for recreational 
use must study carefully the basis used by Judge Leavitt to sustain it in the 
Bonnie Briar context. What if the land were not located in a critical flood plain and 
did not contain wetlands and other environmental constraints?  What if the 
zoning only applied to a single parcel, owned by one individual ?  What if the 
objective of the recreational zoning were to create a park or other public place: a 
government enterprise? What if the land had not been used profitably for a 
private recreational use for over seven decades? What if the recreational uses 
allowed were too few or too limited to create a meaningful economic opportunity 
for the property owner?  What if the demand for the recreational development 
allowed were weak in the vicinity of the land affected?   
 
 Three communities in the northern suburbs in the New York metropolitan area 
are debating open space and recreational zoning in contexts quite different from 
Mamaroneck’s. In one village, a 55 acre parcel which had been used as an old 
age home, situated on rugged terrain, was zoned as a  Preservation 
Development District. The principal uses permitted in this district were limited to 
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public parks, playgrounds or similar recreational areas; natural open space areas 
and uses designed for environmental or ecological preservation; and public 
buildings or uses operated by the village itself. By special permit, the district 
allowed the development of golf courses and country clubs, public utility facilities 
and cemeteries. The village comprehensive plan study calls the site “an 
unusually fine recreational asset for the Village” and proposes that it be used as 
a “park.” The 55 acre parcel is not suited for golf course development, leaving 
only quasi-public uses of doubtful economic value. Under the pressures of 
litigation, the village rezoned the area for low density, residential development 
designed to protect the natural environment. Still open for resolution is whether 
the village is liable for damages for a temporary taking under First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church (482 U.S. 304, 1987) during the time the 
Preservation Development District was in existence. 
 
 In another community, a proposal has been made to zone a single, 
individually owned 160 acre parcel exclusively for open space and park uses.  In 
another, a large relatively unconstrained parcel that has been proposed for 
condominium development is being considered for recreational zoning of the type 
adopted in the Town of Mamaroneck which prohibits residential use.  This parcel 
is not severely constrained environmentally, is not located in a critical flood plain, 
and has not been used profitably as a private recreational facility.  It is not 
situated next to two other large properties regulated in the same way and it is not 
the only property of its type in the community. The differences that these 
changes in context make regarding the validity of recreational zoning will be 
explored and, undoubtedly, litigated as the future of this novel land use technique 
unfolds in New York. 
